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Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.:
Federal-State Comity in

Employment Discrimination
INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 broadly prohibits
discrimination in employment practices and establishes administrative and judicial procedures for employment claim adjudication. 2 Senate and House members who drafted Title VII were
aware that many states had existing statutes which similarly
prohibited employment discrimination and which provided for
claim adjudication procedures. 3 In enacting Title VII, Congress
made clear its intention not to supplant those state systems.4
Congress made it equally clear, however, that federal courts need
not accord res judicata5 or collateral estoppe 6 effect to decisions
reached by state administrative agencies. 7 Thus, traditional preclusion principles as embodied in federal case law and statutes
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
2. Title VII was enacted as part of an overall scheme to protect the civil rights of
persons in the United States. Title VII itself makes it unlawful for any employer to:
IFlail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (1976).
3. See 110 CONG. RE(. 7214, 7216 (1964) (interpretive memorandum of Senators Clark
and Case, floor managers at Title VII).
4. Title VII itself specifically provides for continued operation of state employment
anti-discrimination laws. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
5. Traditionally, the doctrine of res judicata (also referred to as claim preclusion) has
stipulated that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and thus precludes further judicial adjudication of the same cause of action. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAl.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDIC'rON § 4402 (1981).
6. Under this doctrine, a prior judgment between parties on a cause of action precludes, in a subsequent, different cause of action, litigation of all issues upon which a
finding or verdict was given in the prior judgment. Modern writers also refer to this
doctrine as issue preclusion. Id.
7. An administrative agency's determination may be given either res judicata or collateral estoppel effect if the agency acted in its judicial capacity and properly resolved the
issues and if the parties involved had adequate opportunity to litigate the matter to be
foreclosed from reconsideration. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S.
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do not prevent a federal court from addressing issues already
decided by a state agency.
The preclusive effect of state judicial resolutions of employment discrimination claims upon subsequent Title VII actions
was not decided until 1982, in Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Corp.8 In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a situation in which an equal employment litigant first brought his
claim to a state agency and then, after having his claim dismissed by that agency, appealed to the state's appellate court.
The appellate court limited its review to a determination of
whether the state agency abused its discretion in dismissing the
claim. The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the principles of
federal-state comity which it embodies required the federal courts
to accord full faith and credit to the state appellate court's decision because that decision had res judicata effect in the state's
own courts. 9 The petitioner in Kremer contended that Title VII
provided an exception to section 1738 which required that federal
courts grant no preclusive effect to outcomes under state judicial
proceedings. 10 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that Title VII's exception to section 1738 extends only to
state administrative agency decisions.'I
The Kremer decision has had a direct impact on the manner in
which equal employment claims are now being resolved. Specifi394, 422 (1966). See also 4 K. C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21:2 (2d ed. 1983).
Title VII provides, however, that an equal employment litigant who initially brings
proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant appropriate relief is
allowed to bring a Title VII action within three hundred days of the alleged violation or
within thirty days of notification of the termination of state proceedings, whichever is
earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
8. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
9. Id. at 466. Section 1738 provides that:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any State, Territory or
Possession ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
Recent cases exemplify the Court's adamance in adhering to the principles of comity
embodied in § 1738. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (Court held that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 did not provide an exception to § 1738); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147
(1979) (plaintiff, United States, collaterally estopped from challenging prior judgment of
state supreme court because it exercised sufficient control over the state court litigation
and because to further litigate in federal court would be to redetermine issues previously
resolved).
10. 456 U.S. at 476.
11. Id.
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cally, prior to Kremer, three circuits did not afford preclusive
effect in similar situations. 2 Kremer's narrow holding now
requires that full faith and credit be afforded in these circumstances. 13 Furthermore, when the holding of Kremer is applied
in different factual contexts, there may be a danger to federalstate comity that the Kremer Court perhaps did not anticipate.
In Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 14 for example, the Third
Circuit, relying on Kremer, allowed an equal employment plaintiff who was victorious at the state agency level to be forced by
an appellant-defendant to pursue his state remedies to the exclusion of his federal remedies.1 5 The Davis decision thus may
make it attractive for such plaintiffs to circumvent the state
remedies altogether.
This note examines the Court's resolution of the issues in
Kremer and explores the decision's future impact. The majority
opinion's application of modern claim preclusion principles in
the context of Title VII is first examined. This note then addresses
the possible exception that Title VII provides to the full faith and
credit requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Finally, the policy considerations inherent in the principles of federal-state comity that
underlies the Court's decision are discussed. This note concludes
that the Kremer decision, as interpreted by lower courts, may
actually adversely affect these interests.
12. Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1980) (decision in class action
brought before state agency and affirmed by state Supreme Court did not preclude subsequent Title VII action); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.
1975) (Iowa Supreme Court's finding that a bona fide occupational qualification excluding females from obtaining particular jobs at state reformatory for men existed was not
res judicata in subsequent Title VII action); Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447
(7th Cir. 1974) (application of § 1738 in Title VII context rejected even though plaintiff
had continued proceedings at the state level beyond the sixty day requirement of 42
U.S.C. § 2000c-5(2) and had litigated certain issues in a state court because of defendant's

appeal to that court).
13. Several commentators have examined issues analogous to those faced by the Kremer
Court. See, e.g., Jackson, Matheson, & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and
Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1485 (1981); Note, General
Developments-Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 29 (1980); Note, 'Twas a Nibble

Not a Bite: Res Judicataand Section 1981,53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 187 (1978); Note, Res Judicatain
Successive Employment DiscriminationSuits, 1980 U. IuL L.F. 1049; Comment, Civil
Rights-CivilProcedure:State Appellate Court Judgmenton Employment Discrimination
is Res Judicatain Subsequent FederalAction Under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 62 MINN. L. REV. 987 (1978); Comment, Employment Discrimination-StateJudicial

ProcedureForeclosesFederalRemedy Under42 U.S.C. § 1981: Mitchell v. NBC, 31 RUTGERS
L. REV. 973 (1979).
14. 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982).
15. Id. at 168-69, 176 n.12. See also infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

Res Judicata
The Constitution provides that each state shall accord "full
faith and credit" to the judicial proceedings of every other state. 16
28 U.S.C. section 1738 extends this principle by directing the federal courts to accord preclusive effect to state judicial proceedings. 17 In enforcing this statutory provision, courts have been
guided by traditional principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in determining whether it is appropriate to accord preclusive effect to a previous decision.1s Generally, if the same
cause of action has previously been raised or if the identical
issue has already been litigated in a prior action, application of
section 1738 will be appropriate. 19
The federal judiciary's consistent adherence to section 1738 is
rooted in a desire to preserve federal-state comity and to promote
judicial efficiency.26 That application of preclusion doctrines in
appropriate circumstances will conserve judicial resources is
readily apparent. The preservation of federal-state comity, however, is a more complicated matter. Preservation of comity has
long been viewed as necessary to the health of the Union; despite
its abstract nature, it is a concept that has guided the application of the doctrine of federal abstention 2 as well as the enforcement of section 1738.22 Of course, in the section 1738 context, the

16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
17. See supra note 9. Congress enacted the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 almost
immediately after the adoption of the Constitution (Act of May 26, 1790, ch.11, 1
Stat.122).
18. See supra notes 5-6.

19. Id.
20. Justice White cited both of these goals in his Kremer opinion. Kremer, 456 U.S. at
467 n.6. See also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153 (1979), Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
21. The abstention doctrine was judicially created in the case of Railroad Comm'n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pullman Court held that when a federal
constitutional claim is premised on an unsettled question of state law, the federal court
should stay proceedings to provide the state courts a chance to settle the state law question. The federal courts' abstention avoids the possibility of unnecessarily deciding a
constitutional question. The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the doctrine
should not be applied if doing so would permanently deprive the litigant of federal rights.
Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975); Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
22. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See generally Friendly, Federalism, A
Foreword,86 YALE L.J. 1019 (1977).
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statute mandates federal deference, but principles of comity
guide the enforcement of the statute if its applicability to a given
case is uncertain.
Judicial comity has been defined as the principle in accordance with which the courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to
the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, not as a
matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect. 23 Justice
Black, in a now-famous passage, emphasized that comity involves a "proper" respect for state functions and a recognition
that the national government will function more effectively if the
states perform their functions in their own ways. 24 In the section
1738 context, Justice Black's principle of according a "proper"
respect to state functions may mean that a moderate, sensible
approach should be taken when deciding whether principles of
comity mandate the application of section 1738 in uncertain
25
cases.
While section 1738 governs the preclusive effect that a federal
court should give to a state court in most circumstances, it is
possible that later-enacted federal statutes may provide an
exception to section 1738 in special situations. 26 The Supreme
Court has emphasized, however, that section 1738 will control
unless the subsequent statute evinces a clear Congressional
intention to leave section 1738 inoperative in the particular
situation. 27 Although repeals by implication have not been
favored, the Court has acknowledged that an implied exception
will be recognized to the extent that the later statute and section
1738 irreconcilably conflict and Congress's intention to leave
'28
section 1738 inoperative is "clear and manifest.

23. Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943, 948 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
24. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-45.
25. This conclusion is inferred from Justice Black's statement that "the concept does
not mean blind deference to 'States Rights' any more than it means centralization of
control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts." Id. at 44.
Justice Black's discussion of comity, however, is necessarily stated in general terms
and has not led to consistent judicial results when used as a guide, particularly in the
federal abstention cases. See 17 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 5, § 4251. See
also Koury, Section 1983 and Civil Comity: Two for the Federalism Seesaw, 25 Loy. L.
REV. 659 (1979).
26. The Supreme Court acknowledged this possibility in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 99 (1980).
27. In Allen v. McCurry the Court specifically held that a later-enacted statute must
expressly or impliedly repeal § 1738 to be in order for § 1738 to be inoperative in a given
case. Id.
28. In Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148 (1976), the Court held that the
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Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
assure equal employment opportunities by making it unlawful
for employers to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 29 Congress preferred that cooperation
30
and voluntary compliance be the means to achieve this goal.
To that end, it created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"), establishing a framework within which
existing state and local employment discrimination agencies and
the EEOC would have an opportunity to settle disputes before
31
the aggrieved party was permitted to file a lawsuit.
Under the 1964 Act, the EEOC's powers were limited to facilitating appearances of witnesses, coordinating efforts with state
and local agencies, providing technical legal services, and referring matters to the Attorney General with recommendations to
institute or to intervene in civil proceedings. 3 2 These powers
were expanded in 1972 when Congress amended Title VII to give
the EEOC further authority to perform investigations of discrimination charges, to promote voluntary compliance with Title VII,
and to bring civil actions against violators of Title VII re33
quirements.
The EEOC, however, does not have any direct powers of enforcement. If disputes under Title VII cannot be resolved through
agreement of the parties, any further action must take place in
federal court. 34 If the Commission finds reasonable cause that a
violation has occurred, it may bring an action against the

broad venue requirements of the Securities Exchange Act do not repeal the narrow venue
requirements of the National Bank Act. Id. at 154, 158. In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980), the Court further held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create an exception to
§ 1738. 449 U.S. at 105. In McCurry, however, the Court did imply that the federal habeas
corpus statute, which expressly delineates the conclusiveness of certain state judicial
resolutions, provides an exception to § 1738. 449 U.S. at 98 n.12.
29. See supra note 2. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800
(1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 44 (1974).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1976).
32. THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 42 (BNA
1964) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS].
33. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (1972)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), (g) (1976).
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127

employer. 35 In the absence of such reasonable cause, the Com-

mission will not bring an action but must instead notify the
individual that he or she may bring a federal action. 36 Title VII
authorizes federal courts to enjoin violations and to order appropriate affirmative action to remedy the effects of unlawful em37
ployment practices.
In addition to lacking direct enforcement power, the EEOC is
not authorized to consider the merits of charges brought before it
if a state agency has jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints and that agency has not had at least sixty days
to resolve the matter. 38 Any attempt within the state to resolve
the dispute is referred to generally by Title VII as "state proceedings." 39 Prior to the Kremer decision, the Supreme Court indicated that the word "proceeding" in Title VII was used to refer to
all the different types of proceedings in which employment discrimination claims are heard, that is, state and federal, administrative and judicial. 40 Under a 1972 amendment, Title VII directs
the EEOC to accord "substantial weight" to outcomes under
state proceedings when determining whether a charge is supported by reasonable cause.4
Because litigants are allowed to bring federal actions after the
termination of proceedings before state administrative bodies
under specific provisions of Title VJI,42 it is clear that final decisions of these administrative bodies are not entitled to preclusive
effect under section 1738. 43 Whether state judicial review proceedings that are deferential to the agency proceedings deserve
preclusive effect was the issue before the Kremer Court.

35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). See supra note 7. The administrative prerequisite to
bringing an action are different for an individual than those for the EEOC.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). An individual's right to sue is, of course, supplemental to other rights he or she may have. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), for example, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of election of remedies did
not preclude a plaintiff who had received an adverse ruling in an employment discrimination arbitration hearing from suing his employer under Title VII. Id. at 59-60.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
40. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 62-63(1980).
41. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 104
(1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976)).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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KREMER V. CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION

Factual Context
Complainant Rubin Kremer filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that his employer
had discharged and subsequently failed to rehire him because of
his national origin and Jewish faith.44 Under federal law, the
EEOC could not consider the claim until the state agency having
jurisdiction over employment discrimination in New York had at
least sixty days to resolve the matter.45 Accordingly, the Commission referred the complaint to the New York State Division of
Human Rights ("NYHRD"), the agency charged with enforcing
the New York employment discrimination statute.46 After an

investigation, the NYHRD ruled that there was no probable
cause to believe that Kremer's employer had engaged in the
alleged discriminatory practices. 47 The state agency based its
ruling on the finding that neither Kremer's creed nor his age was
a factor in the employer's failure to rehire him.48 The NYHRD's
ruling was upheld by its appeals board as "not arbitrary, capri49
cious, or an abuse of discretion."

44. Kremer was one of many employees included in a general layoff. His claim
focused on his employer's failure to rehire him. 456 U.S. 461, 463 (1982).
45. See supra text accompanying note 38.
46. The section empowering the NYHRD to review claims arising under New York's
employment discrimination statute states, in relevant part:
The [Human Rights] division, by and through the commissioner or his duly
authorized office or employee, shall have the following functions, powers and
duties... [t]o receive, investigate and pass upon complaints alleging violations
of this article ....
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 295-6(a) (McKinney 1982).

47. 456 U.S. at 464.
48. Two facts supported this finding. First, one of Kremer's former colleagues whom
the company did choose to rehire after the layoff had greater seniority than Kremer.
Second, another person who was rehired filled a lesser position than that previously held
by Kremer. Id.
49. Id. The appeals board review was consistent with New York statutory enactments,
which provide that:
The [Human Rights Appeal] board may affirm, remand or reverse any order of
the [Human Rights] division or remand the matter to the division for further
proceedings in whole, or with respect to any part thereof, or with respect to any
party, provided however that the order of the division is... supported by substantial evidence on the whole record, or not arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 297-a-7 (McKinney 1982).
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Kremer then filed a petition with the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court to set aside the adverse administrative
decision.50 The Appellate Division unanimously upheld the NYHRD's
ruling.5 ' Under New York law, the scope of the Appellate Division's review was limited to a determination that there was substantial evidence supporting the NYHRD's decision and that the
ruling was not "arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse
52
of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
Meanwhile, Kremer had brought his complaint before the
EEOC a second time. 53 After the New York Appellate Division's
ruling, an EEOC District Director ruled that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the charge of discrimination was true,
Disand thereupon issued to Kremer a right-to-sue notice.5 4 The
55
trict Director denied Kremer's request for reconsideration.
Kremer then brought his Title VII action in federal district
court alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin and
religion.5 6 The district court held that the doctrine of res judicata
barred Kremer's action because the issues had already been
resolved in state court. 57 The Court of Appeals for the Second
59
Circuit affirmed 58 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Majority Opinion
The Kremer majority stated that it was according section 1738
preclusive effect to the New York Appellate Division's decision in
upholding the NYHRD ruling.6 0 While according preclusive effect
to the NYHRD determination itself would have conflicted directly
with Title VII,61 the Court concluded that according preclusive
effect to the lower court ruling did not conflict with Title VII.
50. 456 U.S. at 464.
51. Id.
52. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 297-a-7 (McKinney 1982).

53.
54.

456 U.S. at 465.
Id. The issuance of a right-to-sue notice is required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1),

-5(f)(3) (1976). See supra note 36 and accompanying text.

55.

456 U.S. at 465.

56. 477 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) aff'd, 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S.
461 (1982).
57. Id.

58.
59.

623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
452 U.S. 960 (1981).

60.
61.

456 U.S. at 470 n.7.
Title VII accords litigants the right to initiate a federal suit after the termination

of state agency proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Justice White, speaking for the majority, divided the Court's
analysis of fact and law into two sections.
In the first section, the Court addressed Kremer's contention
that Title VII relieves federal courts of their usual obligation to
grant finality to state court decisions. The Kremer majority
based its analysis of whether Title VII partially repeals section
1738 on statutory construction guidelines provided by several
Supreme Court decisions. The Court noted that in its decision in
Allen v. McCurry62 it had held that exceptions to section 1738
are not to be recognized unless a later statute contains an
express or implied partial repeal. 63 Because there was no claim
that Title VII expressly repealed section 1738, the Court limited
its focus to an examination of whether there was any repeal by
implication. The Court then stated that "[i]t is ... a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication
64
are not favored."
More significant to the Kremer Court's analysis was the principle delineated in Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,65 which it
applied in determining whether Title VII impliedly repealed section 1738. The Court stated that the Radzanower rule limits the
situations in which an implied repeal will be recognized to two.
First, where provisions of the two statutes are in irreconcilable
conflict, the later statute repeals the earlier one to the extent of
the conflict. 66 Second, when the later statute covers the entire
subject matter of the earlier one, it will repeal the earlier statute. 67 The Radzanower Court emphasized, however, that in either
of the two situations there must also be a showing that the legislature had a "clear and manifest" intention to repeal. 68
The Kremer Court's use of these categories easily led to its
conclusion that Title VII did not partially repeal section 1738.69
The second category did not pose difficulty, because Title VII is
clearly not a substitute for section 1738. The Court had more difficulty disposing of the first category's restrictions, but ultimately
decided that there is no irreconcilable conflict between Title VII
62. 449 U.S. 90 (1980). See supra note 28.
63. 456 U.S. at 468.
64. Id.
65. 426 U.S. 148 (1976). See supra note 28.
66. 456 U.S. at 468.
67. Id.
68. Id. The Radzanower Court relied upon its holding in Posadas v. National City
Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
69. 456 U.S. at 468.
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and section 1738.70 The majority relied upon two factors in
reaching its conclusion. First, the Court emphasized the language in Title VII that provides for the states' continued role in
the overall scheme dealing with employment discrimination. The
statute provides that a litigant may press his claim before the
EEOC only after affording a state agency opportunity to resolve
the complaint. 71 The statute further stipulates that the EEOC
should "accord substantial weight to final findings and orders
made by State and local authorities in proceedings commenced
under State or local law." 72 The Court interpreted this latter

clause as indicating only the minimum level of deference the
EEOC must accord to all state determinations. 73 Thus, the Court
concluded that Title VII does not bar the according of section
74
1738 preclusive effect if "judicial action is involved."
The Court also drew upon Title VII's legislative history in concluding that there is no irreconcilable conflict between Title VII
and section 1738. 7 5 The Court cited for support the comments

made by several senators during debates over the proposed statute.7 6 The majority particularly highlighted Senator Humphrey's

desire that the states be given adequate opportunity to resolve
discrimination issues.7 7 In addition, the Court noted Senator
Dirksen's concern that under the Title VII scheme federal and
state courts may call for conflicting remedies in the same cases,78
as well as the statement made by Senators Clark and Case that
Title VII specifically provides for the continued effectiveness of
state and local laws and procedures in the employment discrimination area. 79 The Court concluded that these statements indicated that Congress did not intend for Title VII to operate as an
exception to section 1738.80
70. Id.
71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
73. 456 U.S. at 470.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 472-76. The Court did not emphasize discussions in the House. This is probably because the Senate prepared the bill that was ultimately passed. The House, instead
of arranging for the usual conference to settle points of disagreement with the Senate's
amended version of the bill, merely voted to accept the measure as amended by the
Senate. 110 CONG. REG 15,981 (1964)See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 32, at
22.
77. 456 U.S. at 473.
78. Id. at 474 n.14.
79. Id. at 472-73 n.12.
80. Id. at 476.
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The Court further relied upon Senate discussions occurring at
8
the time the 1972 amendments to Title VII were being prepared. 1
At that time Senator Hruska had introduced an amendment that
would .have eliminated many of the "duplicative" remedies for
employment discrimination by mandating that actions filed un82
der Title VII provide exclusive remedies for a particular case.
Senator Hruska wanted to eliminate the possibility of litigants
pressing their grievances in successive actions pursuant to various contractual and statutory provisions, including collective
bargaining agreements, the National Labor Relations Act, state
fair employment practices laws, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and
Title VIIY"3
Senator Javits, on the other hand, did not believe that the
amendment was necessary because he believed that the doctrine
of res judicata would prevent repetitive litigation. 4 Relying on
Senator Javits' reference to res judicata principles, the Court
concluded that the Senate's rejection of the Hruska amendment
(by an evenly divided vote) reflected an intention to allow section
1738 preclusion principles to remain operative in the Kremer context.8 5 The Court reached this conclusion even though the Hruska
amendment, under a specific exception, would not have provided
that state remedies be merged into Title VII remedies when a Title
86
VII action and a state action are pending at the same time.
After determining that Title VII does not circumvent section
1738, the majority disposed of Kremer's claim that the New York
procedures accorded him were not sufficiently extensive to merit
res judicata effect in federal court.8 7 Kremer had argued that
Title VII vested in him the right to have a judicial authority
eventually address the merits of his claim.8 8 Because the New
York Appellate Division's review was merely deferential to the
state agency's findings,8 9 Kremer contended that to accord

81. Id. at 475-76.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Describing his proposed amendment, Senator Hruska indicated that "there would
be a further exception and that would [provide that] proceedings in a State agency ...
could continue notwithstanding the pendency of an employer's action under . . . Title
VII." Id. (quoting 118 CONG REC. 3369 (1972)).
87. Id. at 479.
88. Id. at 492 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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that review preclusive effect would be to deny this federal right. 90
The majority disagreed, holding that the New York procedure,
including the agency hearings, need only satisfy minimum Constitutional due process requirements in order to be given full
faith and credit. 91 Moreover, the Court also cited authority which
indicated that the New York courts did in fact pass upon the
92
merits of employment discrimination claims.
Throughout its opinion, the majority emphasized that federalstate comity should be preserved. Rebutting the contention that
the Kremer decision would deter equal employment litigants
from seeking relief in a state forum, the Court stated that
"[d]epriving state judgments of finality not only would violate
basic tenets of comity and federalism ... but also would reduce
the incentive for states to work towards effective and meaningful
discrimination systems."9 3
The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, disagreed with the majority on each point of its analysis. He first addressed the majority's refusal to find that Title VII provides an exception to section
1738. Examining the statutory language relied upon by the
majority that directs the EEOC to accord "substantial weight" to
outcomes under state proceedings, Justice Blackmun arrived at a
conclusion opposite to that of the majority. 94 Justice Blackmun
reasoned that if any state employment discrimination proceedings were intended to have preclusive effect, Congress would not
merely have instructed that these proceedings be given "substantial weight. '95 Moreover, Justice Blackmun continued, the
majority had acknowledged that state agency proceedings standing by themselves are not accorded preclusive effect under the
Title VII scheme even though they were included in Congress's
definition of state proceedings that were to be given substantial
weight.9 6 To say that state judicial review proceedings should be
accorded preclusive effect in federal courts therefore means that

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
456 U.S. at 481.
Id. at 481 n.21. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 488-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 73.
456 U.S. at 488-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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the term "substantial weight" has a different meaning, depending on which type of proceeding has occurred. 97 Because there is
no reference in Title VII to such a double meaning, Justice
Blackmun believed that such a conclusion would be misplaced,
and the term "substantial weight" thus should be interpreted as
requiring that no preclusive effect be given to state judicial
98
proceedings.
Justice Blackmun further believed that, even granting the
majority's conclusion that Title VII provides no exception to
section 1738, the majority had misapplied the preclusion rules of
section 1738 in according full faith and credit to the New York
Appellate decision. 99 In order for a previous decision to be granted
preclusive effect, he contended, the legal matters raised in the
second case must be the same as those determined in the first
case. 100 In Kremer, the state agency ruled on the merits of the
discrimination claim; the Appellate court only examined whether
the state agency's ruling was arbitrary or capricious, without
examining the merits of the claim. 10 1 Thus, Justice Blackmun
concluded that the majority was either granting preclusive effect
to the state agency's decision, which clearly violates Title VII, or
granting preclusive effect to a state court decision that did not
10 2
address the issue before the federal court.
Justice Stevens dissented separately. He agreed with the majority that Title VII provides no exception to section 1738.103 He
agreed with Justice Blackmun, however, that the issues decided
in the New York court were not the same as those facing the
federal court, and that consequently there should have been no
10 4
section 1738 bar.
THE COURT'S RES JUDICATA RATIONALE
Beginning its analysis of the res judicata issue, the Kremer
majority stipulated that state proceedings need only satisfy the
minimum procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendment's

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

456 U.S. at 488-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. See supra notes 5 and 6.
456 U.S. at 493 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 494 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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due process clause in order to be granted preclusive effect by the
federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.105 In deciding whether
New York's law satisfied due process in this case, the Court
framed the issue simply as "whether they (the procedures) should
be deemed so fundamentally flawed as to be denied recognition
under section 1738."106 The Court accorded full faith and credit
to the state court decision and barred Kremer's federal claim
including
because it concluded that the New York procedures,
10 7
those at the state agency level, passed this test.
Close examination, however, reveals difficulties with the test
that the Court employed. The majority considered only whether
08
New York accorded Kremer due process under New York law.'
Having answered this question in the affirmative, the Court
concluded that this standard transferred easily to the federal
domain and caused the preclusion principles to bar a claim
brought there. 0 9 Analysis of precedent, however, seems to cast
doubt on this conclusion.
Comparison of Kremer with previous Supreme Court decisions
suggests that the Kremer Court did not consider the addition to
classical res judicata analysis which Title VII arguably requires.
Specifically, the Kremer Court's view that New York procedure
could "substitute" for federal statutory procedure in this circumstance does not recognize that the issue of due process vis d vis
res judicata should be decided in the context of the litigant's
105. 456 U.S. at 481.
106. Id. at 480.
107. The Court cited several cases that emphasize the "flexible" nature of due process,
including Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961); Inland Empire Council v. Minnis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945). The Court
went on to summarize the New York procedures that it believed to satisfy due process
requirements:
We have no hesitation in concluding that this panoply of procedures, complemented by administrative as well as judicial review, is sufficient under the Due
Process Clause. Only where the evidence submitted by the claimant fails, as a
matter of law, to reveal any merit to the complaint may the Department make a
determination of no probable cause without holding a hearing .... And before
that determination may be reached, New York requires the Commission to
make a full investigation, wherein the complainant has full opportunity to
present his evidence, under oath if he so requests.
456 U.S. at 484-85. Kremer made clear in his brief, however, that he did not "call into
question the fairness of the state procedures." Pet. Reply Brief at 10, Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 S. 461 (1982). The gist of Kremer's contention was that the state
procedures "are simply not equivalent to those in a Federal district court." Id. See infra
notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
108. 456 U.S. at 481.

109.

Id.
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rights, whether rooted in statute or common law. 110 In addition
to focusing on whether New York provided procedures adequate
to decide Kremer's claim, the Court here should have decided
whether the judicial system had given Kremer all the process
granted to him by Congress."' Under Title VII, Congress conferred the right to a judicial trial de novo after a state agency
had been given the statutory period in which to resolve the matter. 12 Because New York could not accord Kremer his right to a
trial under New York law, it was arguably left to the federal
courts to carry out this Congressional mandate. 1 3 The Supreme

110. This idea was expressed in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant: "Due process of law guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights." 416 U.S. at 610 (quoting NLRB v. MacKay Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938)). Thus, due process cannot be analyzed in a vacuum; any scheme that purports to judge the adequacy of process should do
so in the context of the individual's legal rights. More recently, the Supreme Court
implied that a mode of analysis similar to that proposed here is appropriate in the Title
VII context. In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), the complainant obtained in a state agency adjudication all the relief she had claimed except for an
award of attorney's fees. The Court agreed that she could sue for the attorney fees in a
subsequent Title VII action. In so deciding, the Court commented:
Title VII explicitly leaves the States free, and indeed encourages them, to exercise their regulatory power over discriminatory employment practices. Title VII
merely provides a supplemental right to sue in federal court if satisfactory relief
is not obtained in state forums. 706(f)(1). One aspect of complete relief is an
award of attorney's fees, which Congress considered necessary to the fulfillment of federal goals. Provision of a federal award of attorney's fees is not
different from any other aspect of the ultimate authority of federal courts to
enforce Title VII. For example, if state proceeedings result in an injunction in
favor of the complainant, but no award for backpay because state law does not
authorize it, the complainant may proceed in federal court to "supplement" the
state remedy.
Id. at 67-68. See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (Court held
that Federal courts cannot borrow state statutes of limitations in Title VII actions).
111. This modification of the preclusion principle is consistent with previous Supreme
Court decisions. In Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), the Court pointed to
three factors to consider in deciding whether collateral estoppel bars federal actions:
Whether the issues presented ...

are in substance the same ...

; whether con-

trolling facts or legal principles have changed significantly since the state court
judgment; and finally, whether other special circumstances warrant an exception to the normal rules of preclusion.
Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
Arguably, the Court abandoned these factors in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980),
when it limited its focus in determining whether the party against whom the earlier
decision is asserted had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate that issue in the earlier
case. Id. at 95. The Court's due process analysis in Kremer is therefore very similar to the
approach taken in McCurry.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). See also infra text accompanying note 145.
113. Justice Stevens arrived at the same conclusion, but did so without articulating a
clear rule of res judicata analysis. 456 U.S. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice

19831

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.

Court analysis, limited to Kremer and his procedure under New
York law, did not even reach this point of consideration.
The Court justified its limited focus by implying that consideration of the broader context of litigants' rights would require federal courts to employ their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. As the Court explained, this
would violate the precepts of section 1738.114
The Court had previously recognized in Alexander v. GardnerDenver,' '5 however, that federal courts should not so limit their
review when, as here, Congress has given the litigant a right to
sue supplemental to other rights the individual may have.' 16 In
Alexander, the Court acknowledged that Title VII did not
expressly address the relationship between federal courts and
the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective bargaining
agreements; nevertheless, it emphasized that Title VII vests federal courts with "plenary" powers to enforce the statutory requirements. Reversing the lower court holding that the doctrine of
election of remedies prevented a subsequent Title VII action, the
Court implied that there is a presumption in favor of preserving
the supplemental right to sue unless there is evidence in the

"statutory scheme" to rebut

it.117

The Kremer majority acknowledged Alexander, but distinguished it because in Alexander the earlier proceeding was an

Blackmun contended that Title VII provided for trials de novo in federal court no matter
how thorough the process afforded by a state. Id. at 487-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
also infra notes 160-96 and accompanying text. Such a conclusion is reached through
statutory interpretation unrelated to the res judicata analysis employed here.
114. The majority opinion noted:
As we recently noted in Allen v. McCurry ... "though the federal courts may
look to the common law or to the policies supporting res judicata and collateral
estoppel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other federal courts,
Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to
state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would do so." 449 U.S. at 96.
456 U.S. at 481-82 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)).
115. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See supra note 37.
116. 415 U.S. at 48-49.
117. Id. at47. Compare with this the Kremer Court's presumption against
implied repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Supra note 69 and accompanying text. In Alexander,
Justice Powell noted that Title VII vests federal courts with plenary powers to enforce the
statute and specifies with precision the two jurisdictional prerequisites that, if satisfied,
allow an individual to file a lawsuit. First, the individual must file a timely charge with
the EEOC. Second, he must receive and act upon the EEOC's statutory right-to-sue
notice. 415 U.S. at 47.
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arbitration. 1' 8 This dismissal of Alexander seems to overstate
the relative importance to the Alexander Court of the differences
between arbitrative and judicial determinations."1 9 At the same
time this dismissal does not appear to give sufficient weight to
the basis used by the Alexander Court to support its holding.
This basis of the Alexander decision, that Congress provided
supplemental remedies (and thus supplemental rights) in enacting Title VII, should have been applied in Kremer. Indeed, the
Alexander Court noted that the policy reasons which led it to
reject the election of remedies doctrine in the Title VII context
would apply equally to the doctrines of res judicata and collat20
eral estoppel.1
Thus, the Kremer Court should have examined whether the
judicial system had afforded Kremer all the rights granted to
him by Congress instead of limiting its analysis to due process
under New York law. Had it done so, it would have arrived at a
conclusion consistent with that of the Alexander Court and
upheld Kremer's right to bring his claim de novo.
By analyzing the res judicata issue outside the context of
Kremer's statutory rights, the Kremer majority's analysis synergistically applied res judicata doctrines. The Court at first appeared to recognize that the NYHRD determination was not
entitled to preclusive effect. 12' Moreover, it was not possible to
accord preclusive effect to the limited appellate review standing
alone. 22 The Court, however, ostensibly rendered full faith and
23
credit based on the cumulative effect of these two proceedings.'
Justice Blackmun perceived the problem with this in his dissent.1 24 In effect, the Court did grant preclusive effect to the
NYHRD determination, because the New York appellate court

118. 456 U.S. at 477. In doing so, the Court emphasized that arbitrations effectuate
the intent of parties to an agreement, while courts enforce requirements of legislation.
Because the New York Appellate Division in Kremer was reviewing an agency decision
applying law similar to Title VII, the Court saw fit to accord full faith and credit under
§ 1738.
119. The Alexander majority devoted one paragraph to a discussion of the differences
between the arbitrative and judicial settings but spent several pages emphasizing the
supplemental nature of the federal employment discrimination scheme.
120. 415 U.S. at 49 n.10.
121. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
123. Id. The Court emphasized that due process was satisfied by proceedings occurring at both the New York administrative and appellate judicial levels.
124. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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review was one
intended only to detect arbitrariness or ca25
priciousness.'
Admittedly, the majority was not completely unresponsive to
the contention that equal employment claimants deserve judicial
reviews more probing than a review for "capriciousness" if they
are to be barred thereafter from asserting a federal claim. Addressing Justice Blackmun's dissent, the majority cited authority
indicating that the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division's review was as a practical matter quite stringent in equal
employment cases.1 26 The Court did not say, however, that a
more stringent appellate review would be necessary to uphold
application of section 1738.
TITLE VII AS AN EXCEPTION TO 28 U.S.C. section 1738

The Kremer majority held that Title VII did not create an
exception to section 1738.127 Such an exception presumably would

have meant that equal employment litigants could not be precluded under section 1738 from bringing Title VII actions even if
states were to grant agency hearings followed by trials de novo
equivalent to federal trials de novo. 128 In reaching its conclusion
that Title VII did not partially repeal section 1738, the Court
employed the test it had originally set forth in Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co.1 29 The Court's use of the Radzanower test in

its analysis, however, is questionable. The use of a more appropriate rule of statutory construction would have led to the conclusion that Title VII does provide an exception to 28 U.S.C. section 1738.
The Radzanower Court held that the broad venue provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act, which allow for a suit to be filed in
any district where the defendant may be found, do not repeal the
narrow venue provision of the National Bank Act. 130 Before the
Radzanower Court employed its two-part test 31 it focused upon
the particular relation between the two statutes by noting a
"basic" principle of statutory construction that a statute cover-

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
456 U.S. at 480-81 n.21.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 488 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
426 U.S. 148 (1976). See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
426 U.S. at 158.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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ing a broad area does not repeal an earlier enacted statute deal132
ing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject.
Within this narrow context, then, the Radzanower Court applied its test. The test's requirements are difficult to meet, but
necessarily so, because when interpreting a later general statute,
there is a significant risk that the Court will act as a legislature
if it finds repeal by implication. 133 In Kremer, however, the issue
was whether a later-enacted specific statute repealed an earlier
general statute. 134 The danger against which the Radzanower
test operates therefore did not exist in the Kremer situation
because the specificity of the later statute lessened the danger of
judicial "legislation." Thus, the Court used a strict test designed
1 35
to safeguard against a risk that did not exist in Kremer.
Courts and scholars have suggested a more appropriate test
for situations such as Kremer in which a later enacted special
statute arguably partially repeals an earlier general one. As
early as 1883, the Supreme Court recognized that it is "familiar
law" that a specific statute controls over a general one "without
regard to priority of enactment."' 36 Subsequent cases, including
Radzanower, have expressed identical axioms. 137 Sutherland, in
his treatise on statutory construction, also agrees that a nar-

132. 426 U.S. at 153.
133. Sutherland notes that basic to the presumption against implied repeal is the
notion that existing statutory law is the result of popular will. For a court to unnecessarily infer a repeal would be to substitute its will for the popular will. IA SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.16 (1972).
134. See supra notes 9, 128 and accompanying text.
135. The Kremer majority also relied heavily on Posadas v. National City Bank, 296
U.S. 497 (1936). The Posadas Court considered whether portions of the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913 were repealed by the equally specific Organic Act of 1916. Reliance upon
Posadaswas also thus misplaced, because the Kremer Court was deciding the effect of a
later-enacted specific statute upon an earlier general one, not the relationship between
two equally specific statutes.
136. Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883).
137. 426 U.S. at 153; Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 751, 758 (1961).
Moreover, even the McCurry Court implied that a different analysis would be appropriate
when faced with determining the effect of a later-enacted specifically worded statute upon
§ 1738.449 U.S. at 99. In upholding § 1738 preclusion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, the Court
distinguished the habeas corpus statute, under which federal actions are less easily precluded by state actions. The McCurry majority noted that the habeas statute expressly
defines the effect of state-court criminal judgments at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), and that it further
presumes a state court resolution to be correct except in eight specific circumstances,
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 449 U.S. at 99. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, also
note that the analogy between § 1983 and the habeas statute is imperfect. 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER,& E. COOPER, supra note 5, at § 4471.
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rowly drawn statute controls over a more generally worded
one.

38

In his discussion, Sutherland notes that a general statute applies to all persons and localities within its jurisdictional scope,
while a "special" statute may exist to treat part of the subject
matter of the general statute with more particularity. 39 The special statute repeals pro tanto the provisions of the general statute
with which it irreconcilably conflicts. More importantly, the special statute will operate as an exception to the general statute
40
even when there is no irreconcilable conflict between the two.'
The use of this rule, which is better tailored to address the
Kremer situation than the Radzanower rule, compels the conclu4
sion that Title VII does provide an exception to section 1738.'
Title VII treats a phase of the same general subject matter in a
more minute way than does section 1738. In unequivocal language, the statute provides that a charge may be filed sixty days
"after proceedings have been commenced under state or local
' 42
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated."'
The only way this language can be interpreted as being consistent with section 1738 is to infer "proceedings" as limited to state
agency proceedings. There is nothing in Title VII, however, to
suggest this limitation, as the Supreme Court previously concluded in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey. 43 Therefore,

138. 1A SUTHERLAND, supra note 133, § 23.16.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The legislative history of Title VII is not as important under the Sutherland test
as under the Radzanower test. Under the Sutherland test, the legislative history is not
examined unless an ambiguity in the underlying statute warrants it. See infra note 148.
Nevertheless, Title VII's legislative history does not alter conclusions reached under the
Sutherland test. See infra notes 147-70 and accompanying text.
142. Previous Supreme Court decisions interpreted the relevant Title VII provisions in
a straightforward manner. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the
Court held that a complainant's right to bring suit under Title VII is not limited to
charges for which the EEOC has made a finding of reasonable cause. In doing so the
Court outlined the steps a litigant need follow to get a trial in federal district court:
Respondent satisfiels] the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action (i) by
filing timely charges of employment discrimination with the Commission and
(ii) by receiving and acting upon the Commission's statutory notice of the right
to sue, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) and § 2000e-5(e).
411 U.S. at 798. In addition to delineating the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal
action, the Court made clear that "we will not engraft on the statute a requirement which
may inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination in the federal courts." Id.
at 798-99.
143. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 488-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the two statutes were not meant to be consistent and the narrower Title VII applies over the broader section 1738.
Additional language in the statute also indicates that federal
courts are not to accord preclusive effect to outcomes under state
law. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII by directing that the
EEOC "accord substantial weight to final findings and orders
made by state or local authorities in proceedings commenced
under state or local law.' 1 44 As the Kremer dissenters persua-

sively argued, this was as far as Congress intended to defer to
the states in equal employment matters. 1 45 Moreover, Congress
gave the federal courts the power to, "in [their] discretion, stay
further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending the
termination of state or local proceedings... or [pending] further
' 146
efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.'

The language of Title VII, while not addressing the issue faced
by the Kremer Court, thus seems to outline the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal Title VII action. The closest it comes to
hinting that section 1738 survives the specific jurisdiction given to
the federal courts in Title VII actions is its mandate that substantial weight be accorded by the EEOC to state findings and orders.
Justice Blackmun argues persuasively that Congress did not
intend to leave section 1738 operative by inserting this clause. 147
The final basis for the Court's decision was its conclusion that
Congress, as shown by the legislative history of Title VII, did
not intend to provide an exception to section 1738 in Title VII
cases. At the outset, it is questionable whether the Court should
have undertaken this inquiry, given the simple specificity of
Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisites.148 Moreover, if a depar-

144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(b) (1976).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98. Justice Blackmun's conclusion is supported by the Court's analysis in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976). In
Chandler,the Court extensively reviewed the 1972 amendments to Title VII and noted
that Congress had rejected proposals to create a Federal administrative agency to hear
and determine employment discrimination cases subject to limited judicial review of the
administrative record. Congress' choice to continue providing trials de novo arguably
reflects an intent not to accord full faith and credit to results under schemes such as that
employed by New York. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
148. Sutherland notes that "it is often declared with reference to various aids to interpretation that they can be used only to resolve ambiguity and never to create it." 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 133, § 46.04. Sutherland states that a clear and unambiguous
statutory provision generally is one that is not contradicted by other language in the
same act. Id. See also comments of Senators Dirksen and Clark infra notes 154-60 and
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ture was to be made from the straightforward wording of the
of a clearly articustatute, it should only have been on the basis
149
history.
legislative
in
lated purpose found
In supporting its conclusion that Congress did not intend to
circumvent section 1738 principles in the Title VII context, the
majority pointed to discussion in Senate debates that emphasized the importance of the states' continuing role in equal employment opportunity. 15 0 The Court further cited a statement by
Senator Humphrey that was inconclusive on the section 1738
issue,1 51 and then stated that "[n]othing in the legislative history of the 1964 Act suggests that Congress considered it necessary or desirable to provide an absolute right to relitigate in fed15 2
eral court an issue resolved by a state court."
The majority found additional historical support for its conclusion in various speeches by sponsoring members of Title VII. In
supporting its contention that "Congress agreed . .. [that] the
federal system should defer only to adequate state laws," 15 3 the
majority quoted the interpretive memorandum of Senators Clark
and Case. This memorandum indicated that Title VII did not
overrule any state or local law that is consistent with its terms
15 4
but rather contemplated the continued operation of these laws.

accompanying text. See generally DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 139 (1975).
149. See, e.g., Litchfield Securities Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1963)
(legislative history examined only to make certain that in applying the strict letter of
Congressional enactment that violence is not done to Congress' goals).

150. 456 U.S. at 473. See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
151. The Court quoted the statement in full as follows:
"We recognized that many States already have functioning antidiscrimination
programs to insure equal access to places of public accommodation and equal
employment opportunity. We sought merely to guarantee that these Statesand other States which may establish such programs-will be given every opportunity to employ their expertise and experience without premature interference by the Federal Government." 110 CONG. REC. 12,725 (1964).
456 U.S. at 473. Indeed, Senator Humphrey's reference to premature interference by the
Federal Government could actually be construed as supportive of a partial repeal of
§ 1738 in Title VII cases. Such a construction of Senator Humphrey's remarks is reasonable in light of his earlier statement that "to avoid the possible imposition of onerous
state requirements for initiating a proceeding, [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c)] provides that to
comply with the requirement of a prior resort to the state agency, an individual need
merely send a written statement of the facts to the state agency by registered mail." 110
CONG. REC. 12,723 (1964).

152. 456 U.S. at 473. The Court's reasoning here is consistent with its use of the Radzanower statutory construction rule. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
153. 456 U.S. at 472.
154. Id.
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The portion of the memorandum cited by the majority, however, does not address the Kremer issue. Later in the same memorandum, Senators Clark and Case did address this issue when
they discussed the Title VII clause that empowers the EEOC to,
in its discretion, agree with state and local agencies that these
agencies handle certain cases exclusively. 155 The Senators rejected a proposed provision that would have automatically granted states exclusive jurisdiction when the remedies for employment discrimination within the state were deemed adequate.156
The Senators emphasized that such a plan would be unworkable
due to the difficulty of determining when state remedies are adequate. 157 Thus, the Senators' interpretive memorandum appears
to favor a construction of Title VII as providing an exception to
section 1738.
The Court also relied heavily on Senator Dirksen's expressed
desire to avoid multiple suits and conflicting court orders arising
out of the same discrimination. 58 Senators Clark and Case,
however, spoke to Senator Dirksen's concern in their memorandum.' 59 Their answer was that "[i]n any event, there cannot be
contrary and conflicting orders from State and Federal agencies,
60
because of the doctrine of Federal supremacy. 1
The Kremer majority further relied upon the Senate's rejection in
1972 of the proposed Hruska amendment to Title VII in concluding
that Congress never intended that section 1738 be inoperative in
the Title VII context.' 6' Senator Hruska introduced an amendment designed to eliminate much of the potential for a multiplicity of actions based on the same offense. 162 The Court emphasized that Senator Javits had argued against the bill by saying
that application of res judicata doctrines would eliminate the
multiplicity problem. 16 3 Because the Senate then rejected the
amendment, the Kremer majority inferred that the legislature

155. 110 CONG. REc. 7214 (1964).
156. Id.
157. Id. The Kremer Court, however, simply noted that the New York statute is "at
least as broad as Title VII." 456 U.S. at 479 n.20.
158. 456 U.S. at 474 n.14.
159. Part of the memorandum was devoted to enumerating Senator Dirksen's questions and answering them specifically.
160. 110 CONG. REc. 7216 (1964).
161. 456 U.S. at 475-76.
162. 118 CONG. REC. 3369 (1972). The bill provided that, with certain exceptions, Title

VII remedies would be exclusive for actions filed under that statute.
163. 456 U.S. at 475.
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endorsed the application of preclusion doctrines in the Title VII
64
context. 1
There are three problems with the Court's reliance on the rejection of the Hruska amendment. First, the amendment was proposed only in the Senate; its rejection indicates nothing with
respect to the views of House members on the issue. Second,
reliance on the history of rejected legislation is even more questionable than drawing conclusions from the history of legislation
voted into law, because the failure of a proposed statute can be
the result of many different factors.16 5 With respect to the Hruska
amendment, there were at least two reasons in addition to the
one emphasized by the Kremer majority that could have prompted the Senators to vote against the bill. The first reason, highlighted in Senator Javits' main argument against the amendment, was that the range of remedies available to equal employment litigants should, as a matter of national policy, be preserved. 166 Further, Senator Javits indicated there was no need
for the amendment, because employers were generally not complaining of harrassment due to the broad range of remedies. 16 7 It
appears, then, that the Kremer majority's inference from the
Hruska amendment's failure is tenuous, because a congressional
desire to leave section 1738 operative is only one of several
explanations for its defeat.
A third argument undercutting the Court's interpretations
with respect to the Hruska amendment is based on the actual
provisions of the amendment. The proposed amendment itself
provided that equal employment actions filed under Title VII
would provide exclusive remedies for the complainant, with certain exceptions. 168 One exception provided that state proceedings could continue despite the pendency of the employee's action
under Title VII.169 Thus, viewing the Hruska amendment in its
entirety, it is difficult to interpret the remarks of Senator Javits
as advocating application of section 1738. Because of the exception
in the proposed amendment that allowed state proceedings to con-

164. Id. at 476.
165. See FOLSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS
18-19 (1979).
166. 118 CONG. REc. 3369-70 (1972).
167. Id. at 3370.
168. Id. at 3369.
169. Id.
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tinue notwithstanding the pendency of a Title VII action, Senator
Javits had no reason to even consider the section 1738 issue.
The history of Title VII in relation to the issue presented in
Kremer is at best inconclusive. The Kremer majority ultimately
recognized this when it stated that "[i]nterpretation of Title VII
is hampered by the fact that there are no authoritative legislative reports."'170 Because strict adherence to the language of the
bill leads to the conclusion that Title VII provides an exception
to section 1738, the Kremer majority should not have applied
section 1738 in this instance and Kremer should have been
allowed his federal claim.
IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY GOALS

The comity and federalism interests embodied in section 1738 were
primary considerations of the Court in according full faith and
credit to the New York Appellate Division's decision to uphold
the NYHRD determination."l Kremer's rationale, however, may
172
actually hinder comity interests in the future.

170. 456 U.S. at 471 n.9. The Supreme Court's conclusion as to the usefulness of the
legislative history is not surprising, given the outlook of Senate members toward establishing a definitive legislative history. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6441 (1964) (illustrating
one Senator's views on the development of legislative history).
Senator Dirksen expressed more colorfully his doubts about the usefulness of the legislative history of what was to become Title VII. Before the Senate was to debate whether
to send the Civil Rights Act to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Senator commented:
There has been great discussion about the intent of Congress. The courts will
take a look at the language in the bill, and out of it they will finally come to a
conclusion as to what was the intent. I believe that one of the most scholarly
legal articles I have ever read on the subject of intent of Congress appeared in
the Harvard Law School Journal. Whoever wrote it did a very good job, because
the very first line in that article was:
The intent of Congress is a fiction.
The second sentence was: The intent of Congress is what the courts say it is.
Id.
Later in his comments, Senator Dirksen noted that literally thousands of pages of
House and Senate reports would be prepared by the time the bill passed. He contended
that such a "legislative history" would be "so lengthy and cumbersome as to judicially
useless." Id. at 6442.
171. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
172. Two cases illustrate the potential hindrance. See infra notes 181-205 and accompanying text. Other courts have had occasion to follow Kremer, but only in narrow contexts similar to that in Kremer. See, e.g., Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358
(5th Cir. 1983) (Kremer used to support upholding § 1738 in context of Sherman AntiTrust Act); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 553 F. Supp. 675 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (plaintiff did not
take her action to state court; Kremer rule not applicable); Snow v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 543 F.Supp. 752 (D. Nev. 1982) (plaintiff did not appeal state agency decision to state
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The Kremer majority was unclear as to what standard of
review it required of the New York Appellate Division before it
granted full faith and credit to its holding. In finding that the
degree of appellate review provided by the Appellate Division,
coupled with the agency proceedings, satisfied due process, 173 the
Court noted that "judicial review... is available to assure that a
claimant is not denied any of the procedural rights to which he
was entitled and that the NYHRD's determination was not arbitrary and capricious."' 1 4 This appears to permit a rather weak
level of judicial review. Earlier in the opinion, however, the Court
implied that it required a more stringent level of review. 75
Responding to Justice Blackmun's and Justice Stevens' complaint that the New York court's holding did not constitute a
finding "one way or the other" on the merits of Kremer's claim,1 76
the Court cited several New York cases in which the Appellate
Division carefully reviewed the NYHRD findings.17 7 The cases
cited appeared to indicate that for the Appellate Division to
affirm the NYHRD's summary dismissal, it must find "that the
complaint lacks merit as a matter of law."'' 78 Further, the Court
explicitly referred to these decisions as being "on the merits."' 179

Thus, reading the Kremer opinion as a whole leaves one uncertain as to what level of review to demand of a state appellate
court in order to invoke section 1738 preclusion.

courts; Kremer rule thus not applicable); Prasad v. Wassaic Developmental Center, 546 F.
Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Kremer rule applicable when plaintiff had appealed adverse
state agency decision to a state court).
173. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
174. 456 U.S. at 484.
175. Id. at 480-81 n.21.
176. Id.at 481.
177. See infra note 178.
178. 456 U.S. at 480 n.21 (quoting Flah's Inc. v. Schneider, 71 A.D.2d 993, 420
N.Y.S.2d 283 (1979)). Other cases that employed similar language were New York State
Div. for Youth v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 83 A.D.2d 972, 442 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1981);
State Div. of Human Rights v. Blanchette, 73 A.D.2d 820, 423 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1979); Stasiak v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 A.D.2d 962, 411 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1978); Altiery v. State
Div. of Human Rights, 61 A.D.2d 780, 402 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1978); State Div. of Human
Rights v. New York Drug Abuse Comm'n, 59 A.D.2d 332, 399 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1977).
179. 456 U.S. at 481 n.21. KENNETH Cuip DAVIS, supra note 7, § 21:5, contended that
courts interpreting Kremer would require state appellate review "on the merits." He could
explain the Court's holding only by noting that "[blecause the majority could not have
intended to change the fundamentals of res judicata, the Court's holding may be in the
nature of a mistake in blacks and whites. The continuing law has to be that a decision
can be res judicata only of what is decided, and a court that holds that an agency's
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The standard of review that the Supreme Court will ultimately
require impinges on the federal-state comity interest at stake.
Arguably, if equal employment litigants understand that their
cases will be accorded reviews deferential to state agency determinations, they will be more inclined to abandon state proceedings before reaching the review level and initiate federal trials de
novo. 180 If, however, these cases are accorded more scrutinizing
levels of review, equal employment litigants will probably be
more likely to pursue state remedies to their conclusions.
The Seventh Circuit faced the issue of the required level of
review in Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp.'8 1 The facts of
Unger are similar to those in Kremer, 182 except that state action
was pursued under Illinois law.' 8 3 In Unger, the complainant
contended that her Title VII action was not precluded under
Kremer because the standard of the appellate review afforded by
the Illinois Appellate Court was not as stringent as the review
the Supreme Court determined that New York courts applied in
Kremer.1s4
The Unger Court of Appeals rejected this argument by concluding that the Supreme Court in Kremer required only a weak

decision is not arbitrary does not decide what the agency decides." Id.
180. See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 447 U.S. 54, 66 n.6 (1980), in
which that Court expressed concern lest "the existence of an incentive to get into federal
court ... undermine Congress' intent to encourage full use of state remedies." Similar
concerns were also expressed by the other circuits that previously did not accord full faith
and credit in the Kremer situation. See supra note 12. See also LARSON. EMPI(.OYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 49.73 (1983). The incentives to avoid state adjudication are thus apparent for plaintiffs who lose at the agency level. As indicated infra notes 190-205 and
accompanying text, the incentives may be stronger for plaintiffs who achieve a "nominal" victory at the agency level.
181. 693 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982).
182. In Unger, the plaintiff filed a complaint before the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices Commission (FEPC) alleging that her first discharge from her job with Consolidated Foods was discriminatory and that her second discharge was retailiatory. A hearing examiner found for the plaintiff on the second discharge but against her on the first
discharge. The full Commission, however, found against plaintiff on both counts. Plaintiff then sought administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County, which reversed the FEPC. Defendant appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court. While that appeal
was pending plaintiff filed the Title VII action in Federal District Court.
183. The Illinois prohibition against employment discrimination is at least as broad
as Title VII. IIt. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 853 (1981). At an FEPC hearing, the parties may be
represented by counsel, testimony is under oath, cross-examination is permitted, the rules
of evidence used in Illinois courts apply, and compulsory process is available. 693 F.2d at
705.
184. 693 F.2d at 706. The complainant in Unger was relying on the Supreme Court's
reference to the cases indicated supra note 178. 693 F.2d at 706.
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level of review. 18 The Unger court acknowledged that the Kremer Court had reviewed the relevant New York decisions and
had noted a stringent standard of review.' 8 6 According to the
Seventh Circuit, however, Justice White was selectively citing
the New York authority in order to rebut certain arguments of
Justice Blackmun.' 87 When examined in their entirety, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that these same New York decisions appeared to direct their review toward arbitrariness and capriciousness rather than the merits of the case. 88 Moreover, the
Kremer Court indicated in its opinion that the lower level of
review would satisfy section 1738 requirements. 8 9 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit read Kremer as requiring only a minimal state
appellate review. As interpreted by the Seventh Circuit, Kremer
thus leaves equal employment litigants with an incentive to circumvent their state remedies.
A Third Circuit decision has made it even more attractive for
equal employment litigants to circumvent the state courts as
quickly as possible by allowing an appellant-defendant to force
an equal employment plaintiff to pursue her state remedies to
the exclusion of her federal remedies. In Davis v. United States
Steel Supply,1 90 plaintiff Davis complained that she was dis-

charged from her job due to her race.' 9' She first brought her
charge before the City of Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations ("PCHR").192 The PCHR found that U.S. Steel had
violated section 8(6) of the Pittsburgh Human Relations Ordinance because it had treated her differently from other employees.

93

U.S. Steel appealed this decision to the Allegheny

County Court of Common Pleas, which concluded that the
PCHR's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was
neither arbitrary nor capricious. 94 U.S. Steel appealed again,
this time to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.' 95 That

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

693 F.2d at 706-07.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 706-07.
Id. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc). Ten circuit judges participated in the con-

sideration and decision of this case.
191. Id. at 168.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 168-69.
195. Id. at 169.
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court reversed the Court of Common Pleas on the ground that
there was inadequate support for the conclusion that the Pittsburgh ordinance had been violated.1 96
Davis did not appeal this decision to a higher Pennsylvania
court.1 97 Instead, she filed suit in federal district court, alleging

that her discharge by U.S. Steel constituted a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1981.198 The issue faced by the Third Circuit, on appeal
from the district court, was whether the doctrine of res judicata
barred Davis' federal action.
Davis argued that her action was not barred because she did
not initiate the review in the state courts. 99 The Third Circuit
disposed of this argument with a direct application of Kremer.
Judge Garth, concurring, reasoned that Justice White, in Kre200
mer, must have been aware of Justice Blackmun's dissent.
Justice Blackmun believed that a plaintiff should not be precluded from a federal action under section 1738 when he had not
initiated judicial review of the administrative ruling but had
instead been forced into a state court by an appellant-defendant.
Because Justice White did not even address Justice Blackmun's
concern, Judge Garth inferred that it makes no difference under
the Kremer Court's res judicata rationale that the plaintiff may
not have voluntarily chosen the state court forum. 201
Judge Gibbons, of the circuit court, dissented in Davis and
illustrated the danger of this ruling to federal-state comity. First,
he noted that not all local governments enthusiastically support
antidiscrimination legislation. 202 According to Judge Gibbons, it
will therefore not be long before local agencies may reach the
conclusion that Title VII claimants can be deprived of a federal
action merely by granting them a "scintilla" of relief at the state
agency level and forcing them into state court via the appeals
203
process.
Whether the Kremer majority contemplated results such as
those in Davis is unclear. In any event, the Davis result is difficult to justify under the Kremer rationale, because the plaintiff

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 176-77 n.12.
Id. at 178 (Garth, J., concurring).
Id. (Garth, J., concurring).
Id. at 189 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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was not the party that sought state court review. Justice White's
opinion in Kremer acknowledged that equal employment litigants have a right under Title VII to abandon state proceedings
in favor of federal proceedings after the conclusion of state
administrative proceedings. 20 4 Depriving these litigants of this
right against their wishes appears to be contrary even to the
spirit of Kremer and to prior Supreme Court decisions. 20 5 The
language of Kremer used by the Third Circuit in Davis, however,
allowed this result.
CONCLUSION
The Kremer majority rested its decision upon two critical
determinations. First, the Court concluded that, in the Title VII
context, process which satisfies minimum Constitutional requirements is sufficient to support a later assertion of section 1738
preclusion, regardless of the right to trial de novo granted under
Title VII. Second, the Court believed that a later statute will provide an exception to section 1738 only if it so expressly provides
or if it irreconcilably conflicts with section 1738. The Kremer
Court held that Title VII did not irreconcilably conflict with section 1738 even though it specified detailed jurisdictional prerequisites for the federal courts.
The Kremer decision, as interpreted by lower courts, may
hinder an equal employment plaintiffs efforts to bring his claim
in a trial de novo. This will be especially true if the plaintiff wins
at the state agency level and the defendant-employer appeals to
a state court, thus making the section 1738 provisions applicable
to a later federal proceeding.
JOHN NOELL

204. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
205. See England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). There, the plaintiffs sought
relief in federal district court for an alleged fourteenth amendment violation. The district
court abstained, reasoning that the state courts could resolve certain issues of state law in
such a manner as to preclude the necessity of addressing the constitutional issue. After the
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled adversely to the plaintiffs, they again filed suit in federal
district court. This time the federal court dismissed the action because it had no power to
review the state proceedings. Plaintiffs then appealed this dismissal to the United States
Supreme Court.
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In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court reversed the district court's dismissal. In
so doing, it emphasized that there are "fundamental objections to any conclusion that a
litigant who has properly invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider
federal constitutional claims can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault
of his own, to accept instead a state court's determination of those claims." Id. at 415. The
Court further noted that a plaintiff forced to litigate in a state court could preserve his
right to later file a federal action by "informing the state courts that he is exposing his
federal claims there only for the purpose of complying with [Government Employees v.
Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957)], and that he intends, should the state courts hold against
him.. .to return to the District Court for disposition of his federal contentions." 375 U.S.
at 421.
If the England Court's rationale can be extended to the Title VII context, equal
employment plaintiffs may try to avoid the problem found in Davis v. United States Steel
Supply by similarly attempting to reserve their right to a federal trial. This could be done
by informing the state agencies and courts that the particular dispute is submitted to
them only to satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional prerequisites.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to extend the
holding of England beyond the context of the federal judiciary's abstention from federal
constitutional issues. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 n.17 (1980).

